Gibbs Giden is Pleased to Announce Four New Partners and Two New Associates
January 08, 2024 —
Gibbs Giden Locher Turner Senet & Wittbrodt, LLPWe take great pleasure in announcing that
Richard Marks and
Kyle Marks have joined the firm. They bring a combined 60 years of real property law experience to Gibbs Giden. Well known Title Insurance and seasoned real estate attorneys they have both served as chair of the Title Insurance Subsection of the Los Angeles County Bar Association and are adjunct professors at Southwestern University School of Law. We are excited to welcome these two exceptional partners and their commitment to representing clients with honesty, integrity, and excellence. You can find them in our firm’s Westlake office.
Talented attorneys
Samantha Riggen and
Christopher Trembley have been named partners. Samantha represents clients in all areas of business and commercial matters with an emphasis on construction litigation on both public and private projects. Christopher’s practice also focuses on construction litigation on behalf of a wide spectrum of industry-stakeholder clients, including suppliers, contractors, and owners. Both work in our firm’s Westlake Village office.
We are also pleased to announce we’ve hired two new associates.
Sarah La Mendola and
Madison Wedderspoon. Sarah has developed an expertise in a wide range of real estate, business, and corporate matters. She received her JD from the University of Pavia, one of the top universities in Italy, in 2012 and her LLM from UCLA in 2015. You can find Sarah in our Westlake Village office. Madison recently graduated from the Boyd School of Law cum laude, is based in our Las Vegas office and works in the areas of business law, contracts, healthcare law, construction, real estate, and common interest community transactional and litigation work.
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Gibbs Giden
A Termination for Convenience Is Not a Termination for Default
April 22, 2024 —
David Adelstein - Florida Construction Legal UpdatesA termination for convenience is NOT a termination for default. They are NOT the same. They should NOT be treated as the same. I am a huge proponent of termination for convenience provisions because sometimes a party needs to be able to exercise a termination for convenience, but the termination is not one that rises to a basis for default. However, exercising a termination for convenience does not mean you get to go back in time and convert the termination for convenience into a termination for default. It does not work like that. Nor should it.
An opinion out of the Civilian Board of Contract Appeals – Williams Building Company, Inc. v. Department of State, CBCA 7147, 2024 WL 1099788 (CBCA 2024 – demonstrates a fundamental distinction between a termination for convenience and a termination for default, i.e., that you don’t get to conjure up defaults when you exercise a termination for convenience:
Because a termination for convenience essentially turns a fixed-price construction contract into a cost-reimbursement contract, allowing the contractor to recover its incurred performance costs, the resolution of this appeal will involve identifying the total costs that [Contractor] incurred in performing this contract before [Government] terminated it for convenience. Since [Government] terminated the contract for convenience rather than for default, it no longer matters whether, in the past,[Contractor] acted intentionally in overstating the amount of its incurred costs or committed a contract breach. Ultimately, as permitted in response to a termination for convenience, [Contractor] will recover those allowable costs that [Contractor]establishes it incurred in performing the contract.
Williams Building Company, supra.
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David Adelstein, Kirwin Norris, P.A.Mr. Adelstein may be contacted at
dma@kirwinnorris.com
Maui Wildfire Cleanup Advances to Debris Removal Phase
February 05, 2024 —
James Leggate - Engineering News-RecordContractors hauled the first truckload of debris from homes destroyed by last year’s wildfires in Lahaina, Hawaii, on Jan. 16. The move marked the beginning of the second phase of debris removal efforts coordinated by federal, state and local officials.
Reprinted courtesy of
James Leggate, Engineering News-Record
Mr. Leggate may be contacted at leggatej@enr.com
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9th Circuit Plumbs Through the Federal and State False Claims Acts
January 16, 2024 —
Garret Murai - California Construction Law BlogYou may have heard of the False Claims Act and know that it penalizes companies and individuals in contract with the government who present false claims. The federal False Claims Act was signed into law by President Abraham Lincoln in 1863 to penalize profiteers during the Civil War who were selling the Union Army moth eaten blankets, boxes of sawdust instead of guns, and sometimes re-selling the Army calvary horses several times over. Since then, many states, including California, as well as municipalities, have enacted their own false claim statutes.
As currently written, the federal False Claims Act provides for statutory penalties against any person who:
- “[K]nowingly presents, or causes to be presented, a false or fraudulent claim for payment or approval”;
- “[K]nowingly makes, uses or causes to be made or used, a false record or statement material to a false or fraudulent claim”;
- “[H]as possession, custody, or control of property or money used, or to be used, by the Government an knowingly delivers, or causes to be delivered, less than all of that money or property”;
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Garret Murai, Nomos LLPMr. Murai may be contacted at
gmurai@nomosllp.com
SCOTUS to Weigh Landowners' Damage Claim Against Texas DOT
November 13, 2023 —
Mary B. Powers - Engineering News-RecordThe U.S. Supreme Court has agreed to hear a case this term that could affect whether states must pay compensation to landowners whose property was damaged by public project execution. Payments also could extend to state owned utilities and others.
Reprinted courtesy of
Mary B. Powers, Engineering News-Record
ENR may be contacted at enr@enr.com
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Insurer’s Broad Duty to Defend in Oregon, and the Recent Ruling in State of Oregon v. Pacific Indemnity Company
January 02, 2024 —
Keith Sparks - Ahlers Cressman & Sleight PLLCOregon law mandates a broad duty to defend, requiring insurers to provide legal representation to their policyholders whenever there is a potential for coverage under the policy. The significance of this broad interpretation means that an insurer has a duty to defend an insured even in situations where the alleged facts only imply a covered claim, and even in situations where the underlying claim is ultimately not covered by the policy. The insurer’s duty to defend is triggered if the allegations of the complaint, reasonably interpreted, could result in the insured being held liable for damages covered by the policy. This is referred to as the “four-corners” rule; it is also sometimes referred to as the eight-corners rule (for the four corners of the complaint plus the four corners of the policy). Oregon’s adoption of a broad interpretation of the duty to defend affirmatively places the onus on insurers to err on the side of coverage.
This broad duty to defend is based on the principle that an insured should not have to bear the expense of defending a lawsuit that the insurer may ultimately have to pay for. The duty to defend is also important because it helps ensure that insureds have access to legal representation when faced with a lawsuit.
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Keith Sparks, Ahlers Cressman & Sleight PLLCMr. Sparks may be contacted at
keith.sparks@acslawyers.com
Reasonable Expectations – Pennsylvania’s Case by Case Approach to the Sutton Rule
February 12, 2024 —
Melissa Kenney - The Subrogation StrategistIn Mutual Benefit Ins. Co. a/s/o Michael Sacks v. Koser, No. 1340 MDA 2023, 2023 Pa. Super. LEXIS 574, 2023 PA Super 252 (Mutual Benefit), the Superior Court of Pennsylvania discussed whether a landlord’s property insurer could file a subrogation action against tenants that had negligently damaged the landlord’s property. Despite there being more than one clause in the lease holding the tenants liable for the damages, the court held that because there was a provision requiring the landlord, not the tenants, to insure the leased building, the insurer could not subrogate against the tenants.
In Pennsylvania, a tenant’s liability for damage to a leased premises in a subrogation action brought by a landlord’s insurer is determined by the reasonable expectation of the parties to the lease agreement. Under this approach, to determine if subrogation is permitted, the court considers the circumstances of the case and examines the terms of the lease agreement.
In Mutual Benefit, the tenants leased and resided in a residential home pursuant to a lease agreement. The lease specifically addressed insurance, stating that landlord was responsible for obtaining insurance on the dwelling and the landlord’s personal property, and tenants were encouraged to procure separate insurance for their personal property. The lease also addressed liability for damage to the leased property, stating generally that the tenants were responsible for damage caused by the tenants’ negligence.
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Melissa Kenney, White and WilliamsMs. Kenney may be contacted at
kenneyme@whiteandwilliams.com
Construction Litigation Roundup: “Ursinus is Cleared!”
March 11, 2024 —
Daniel Lund III - LexologyUrsinus University in Pennsylvania – a “private, nonprofit liberal arts college” – funded a construction project for a new building utilizing monies loaned by the Montgomery County Health and Higher Education Authority, a public economic development authority “formed by the Board of County Commissioners… authorized to issue bonds relative to projects for eligible educational institution such as Ursinus.”
Loans up to the amount of $23,000,000 became available to the University, and construction proceeded using the loans as construction funds. At issue: whether a project was to be considered publicly funded project such that prevailing wage rates were required to be paid. IBEW filed a related grievance with the Pennsylvania Department of Labor and Industry’s Bureau of Labor Law Compliance, which was refused by the Bureau, on the basis that because work was “financed completely by loans from the Authority, which Ursinus was required to repay in their entirety, the Project was ultimately funded through private sources and exempt from coverage under the [Pennsylvania Prevailing Wage Act].” A grievance to the Prevailing Wage Appeals Board ensued, and the Board took a different position.
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Daniel Lund III, PhelpsMr. Lund may be contacted at
daniel.lund@phelps.com